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Imprisonment Of Indigents For Non-Payment Of Fines:
Equal Protection Or Substitute Punishment?
Morris v. Schoonfield'
INTRODUCTION

In still another chapter in the continuing drama of the wayward
indigent, a three judge panel of the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland ruled in Morris v. Schoonfield2 that indigents
cannot automatically be incarcerated for their inability to pay fines and
costs. The court's ruling requires that indigents be given a hearing
at which they are afforded the opportunity of informing the sentencing judge of their indigency. If, after learning of the defendant's
indigency, the judge desires to allow the sentence of a fine to stand,
the impecunious wrong-doer may be incarcerated in the local gaol in
accordance with the statutory scheme. While the court's solution to
this perplexing problem is novel, it falls short of assuring equality in
sentencing between the rich and the poor, and seemingly fails to comport with the dictates of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The use of imprisonment for the non-payment of fines has long
been practiced. Originating in twelfth century England, 3 the practice
has become an integral part of the administration of criminal justice
in the United States.4 Today, a large portion of the people incarcerated
throughout the United States are in jail for default in the payment of
fines.5 Courts have generally adhered to the notion that the imprisonment resulting from the non-payment of a fine is not punishment, but
merely a device to coerce payment,' although these courts have not
been able to satisfactorily explain away the time-worn cliche about
squeezing blood from turnips when applying such statutes to indigents.
While the explanation of imprisonment as a means to coerce payment
of fines appears rational in the abstract, it makes little or no sense
when the failure to pay a fine results from an inability rather than a
refusal to pay.
The Maryland provisions for imprisonment for non-payment of
fines contained in article thirty-eight of the Maryland Annotated Code
are similar to those found in other states. Section one of that article
is the basic authority for imprisonment in default of payment of fines
and costs. 7 Section four sets forth the rate of confinement of two
1. 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969).
2. Id.
3. E. SUTIRLAND & D. CRESSY, CRIMINOLOGY 329 (7th ed. 1966). The history
of the use of fines for punishment is given in S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORREcTION 222 (1963).
4. For a compilation of state and federal statutes providing for imprisonment
for non-payment of fine, see Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment
of the Indigent for Non-Payment of Fines, 64 MICH. L. REv. 938 (1966).
5. See Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty
Days," 57 CALIv. L. REv. 778, 779, 787 (1969).
6. Hill v. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936) ; Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d
592 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Henderson v. United States, 189 A.2d 132 (D.C. App. 1963).
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 1 (1965): ". . . If any person shall be adjudged
guilty of any . . . offense by any court having jurisdiction in the premises, he shall
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dollars per day and prescribes various maximum periods of confinement for certain fines.8
EQUAL PROTECTION

The most persuasive argument against the use of such statutes in
the case of the indigent defendant is found in the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. The use of this clause in eliminating
economic differences in the criminal process was spearheaded by the
Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Illinois.9 In Griffin, the Court
held that an indigent must be provided a free trial transcript for use
in preparing an appeal where his indigency prevents him from obtaining one otherwise.'"

Griffin represented a new approach under the

equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, requiring state
governments to promote economic equality in the criminal process."
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Black succinctly concluded:
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must
be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts."'"
The intended result of Griffin is to ban economic discrimination
at all stages of the criminal process.'" The principle of economic
be sentenced to the fine or penalty prescribed by such act of Assembly or ordinance
and to the costs of his prosecution; and in default of payment thereof he shall be
committed to jail until thence discharged by due course of law."
8. MD. ANN. CODS art. 38, § 4 (1965): "Any person . . . committed to jail ...
for nonpayment of any fine and costs, shall be confined one day for each dollar of
fine and costs but in no event shall be confined more than thirty days for fine and
costs amounting to one hundred dollars, nor more than sixty days for fine and costs
exceeding one hundred dollars but not more than five hundred dollars nor more than
ninety days for fine and costs exceeding five hundred dollars."
9. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10. While this is the generally accepted "holding" of Griffin, it is not technically correct.
Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.
. . . We do not hold, however, that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's
transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it. The Supreme Court
[of Illinois] may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate
review to indigent defendants. For example, it may be that bystanders' bills of exception or other methods of reporting trial proceedings could be used in some cases.
351 U.S. at 19-20.
11. One view of the scope of the amendment is that statutes which are discriminatory on their face violate the equal protection clause. E.g., McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) ; Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ; Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). But see
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the
Indigent for Non-Payment of Fines, 64 MIcH. L. Riv. 938 (1966). Another view
holds that a statute, even though not discriminatory on its face, which is discriminatory
in its application, violates the equal protection clause. E.g., Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Justice Frankfurter illustrated this latter type of violation in Griffin when he wrote,
"[tlhe law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." 351 U.S. at 23.
12. 351 U.S. at 19.
13. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent is entitled to
appointed counsel in first appeal in state court where an appeal is granted as a matter
of right) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (lack of money must not be a bar
to an indigent in seeking a writ of habeas corpus); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959) (lack of docket fees cannot prevent indigent from appealing).
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equality behind Griffin has been used successfully to secure expert
witnesses necessary for the adequate defense of an indigent, 14 to
provide counsel for indigents charged with serious crimes, 5 and to
reimburse an indigent's counsel for expenses incurred in investigating
crimes.' Thus, economic disabilities have been theoretically eliminated in all but two important areas -

bail and sentencing -

the

7
alpha and omega of the criminal process.'
The first attempt to apply the Griffin doctrine of equal protection
to the case of an indigent confined solely because of his inability to
pay a fine is found in United States ex rel. Priviterav. Kross.'8 There
petitioner had been sentenced to thirty days in jail and a $500 fine,
with an additional sixty days in default of payment of the fine. After
his unsuccessful attempts in state courts to have the fine set aside,
he brought habeas corpus proceedings, alleging inter alia, that the
additional imprisonment resulting from his inability to pay the fine
was a violation of the equal protection clause. Pointing out that he
had received less than the maximum authorized imprisonment of one
year, and noting the judge's discretion in tailoring a sentence to the
individual defendant, the court rejected his claim. No different result
was required by Griffin. Even if it were, petitioner would have to be
remanded for resentencing at which time the judge would be free to
impose a straight term of ninety days or more.' 9 Despite this denial
of relief, the court noted that a different question would be presented
where the resulting imprisonment for the non-payment of a fine exceeded the maximum imprisonment authorized for the offense."0
This latter fact situation arose shortly in People z'. Collins,"
in which defendant had been sentenced to both the maximum jail
sentence and a fine. On appeal, defendant contended that his imprisonment violated his rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
The court rejected defendant's eighth amendment claim with little
discussion but found that his fourteenth amendment claim had merit.

14. Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965). See Note, Equal
Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. luv. 394,
413-15 (1964).
15. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
17. While an extensive discussion of bail is beyond the scope of this note, it is
appropriate to point out the possible use of the equal protection clause in holding bail
to be unconstitutional in certain cases of indigents. See Bandy v. United States, 81
S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960) :
To continue to demand a substantial bond which the defendant is unable to secure
raises considerable problems for the equal administration of the law. We have
held that an indigent defendant is denied equal protection of the law if he is denied
an appeal on equal terms with other defendants, solely because of his indigence....
Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because
he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for his freedom?
It would be unconstitutional to fix excessive bail to assure that a defendant
will not gain his freedom. . . Yet in the case of an indigent defendant, the
fixing of bail in even a modest amount may have the practical effect of denying
him release.
Id. at 197-98 (citations omitted).
18. 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
19. 239 F. Supp. at 121.
20. Id.
21. 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange Co. Ct. 1965).
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The court had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
additional imprisonment caused by defendant's inability to pay the fine
violated the equal protection clause since it discriminated between
indigents and non-indigents. The court's rationale in Collins was
two-pronged. First, the man of means has the wherewithal to limit
the amount of time he must spend in jail to the one year maximum.
An indigent, though willing to pay, cannot so limit his term of imprisonment to the maximum confinement authorized by the statute.
Secondly, because the purpose of the additional imprisonment is to
coerce payment of the fine, an exception
must be made for those who
22
are unable and thus uncoercable.

Although Griffin was not discussed, the court's decision in
Collins is an obvious extension of the Griffin rationale of equal
justice for those in unequal circumstances. "To hold otherwise would
add one more disadvantage which the law will place upon the defendant without the money in his pocket to pay his fine, although
the quality of their conduct has been the same and although their
intention to pay the fine has been the same.''23 It is interesting to
note, for purposes which will be discussed later, that the court stated
that the fine itself was not invalid24 and that the state could enforce
it like an ordinary civil judgment.
The problem of the indigent defendant who faced additional
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum by virtue of his inability
to pay a fine was not laid to rest in New York by Collins. Lower court
decisions subsequently divided on the issue. In People v. Johnson,25
the court reached a result similar to Collins by merely noting that the
additional punishment caused by non-payment of the fine was excessive. A concurring opinion would have rested the decision on the
equal protection clause.26 In People v. Redman,27 the court refused
to distinguish this situation from that in which the imprisonment for
non-payment of a fine did not exceed the maximum authorized confinement. The court ignored the decisions in Collins and Johnson and
looked to the federal court's decision in Priviterain denying relief.
This division of authorities set the stage for the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in People v. Saffore.28 Faced with a situation
identical to Collins, Johnson, and Redman, the court held that ".
when payment of a fine is impossible and known by the court to be
22. But see State v. Lavelle, 54 N.J. 315, 255 A.2d 223, 229 (1969) (Weintraub,
C.J., concurring opinion). "The authorized maximum is the authorized maximum jail
term plus the period of time for which, by statute, an offender may be held if the
authorized fine is not paid." 255 A.2d at 229. Of course, such a finding is inconsistent
with the large body of cases holding that the purpose of imprisonment for nonpayment of fines is to coerce payment. See note 6 supra. To support his view of the
maximum permissible punishment, the chief justice had to find "... . that the in-lieu-of
imprisonment is substituted punishment to achieve a punitive aim that could not be
attained by way of a fine." Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
23. 261 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
24. Id. at 974. For a discussion of alternatives to imprisonment as a means of
enforcing fines, see text accompanying notes 61-75 infra.
25. 24 App. Div. 2d 577, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965) (memorandum decision).
26. 262 N.Y.S.2d at 431-32.
27. 48 Misc. 2d 592, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1965).
28. 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
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impossible, imprisonment to work out the fine, if it results in a total
imprisonment of more than a year for a misdemeanor ...

defendant's right to equal protection of the law.

....

"29

violates the

Not only did

the court find that imprisonment of those who were unable to pay
ran contra to the statute, but it also found that it is "an illegal method
of requiring imprisonment far beyond the maximum term. '3 0 With
the exception of two recent cases in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, equal protection as a device to prohibit
the incarceration of those unable to pay fines had reached its highwater mark. 3
Following the riots in Baltimore in April 1968, renewed attacks
were made on the Maryland procedures for confining indigents who
defaulted in payment of fines and costs. 3 2 Kelly v. Schoonfield3 3 was
a class action filed by various persons who had been convicted of
curfew violations during the riots. Two petitioners were sentenced
to fines of one hundred dollars and four dollars costs and four were
sentenced to fines of fifty dollars and costs of four dollars. Inasmuch
as petitioners were indigent and unable to pay their fines and costs,
they were incarcerated in accordance with the statutory scheme for
non-payment.3 4 Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that article
38, sections one and four, were unconstitutional when applied to petitioners and others similarly situated solely as a result of their inability
to pay fines and costs.
The court first found petitioners' claim of a violation of the eighth
amendment prohibitions against "excessive fines" and "cruel and unusual punishment" to be without merit. Citing United States ex rel.
Privitera v. Kross,3" the court pointed out that petitioners were not
being incarcerated for 6a longer period than the maximum permissible
straight jail sentence.'
29. 218 N.E.2d at 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
30. Id. at 687, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 974.

31. While no cases go beyond Saffore to prohibit any imprisonment of an indigent
for non-payment of a fine, there have been other cases which reached the same result
where the maximum jail term would be exceeded. E.g., Sawyer v. District of
Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. App. 1968).
32. Previous attacks on the validity of the Maryland procedures for imprisonment
for non-payment of fines had been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Warden v. Drabic, 213 Md.
438, 132 A.2d 111 (1957) (where more than one fine is imposed, the fines shall not be
totaled for the purpose of determining the resulting imprisonment for non-payment,
but each fine shall be served separately) ; Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 195 A. 532
(1937) (fine of $5000 and the resultant imprisonment for non-payment were not
cruel and unusual punishment notwithstanding the hopelessness of defendant ever
paying) ; Callahan v. State, 163 Md. 298, 162 A. 856 (1932) (provisions of art.
38 are read into sentence of fine so as to make the term of imprisonment for nonpayment definite and certain) ; Dean v. State, 98 Md. 80, 56 A. 481 (1903) (commitment for non-payment of fine is valid even though statute violated provides only for
money fine). It should be noted that the grounds for decision in these cases were
statutory and not constitutional.
33. 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968).
34. At this time. prior to the July 1, 1968 amendment to art. 38, § 3, the rate of
imprisonment was one day for each dollar of fines and costs. MD. ANN. CODV art. 38,

§ 4 (1965).
35. 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
36. 285 F. Supp. at 735. The court also distinguished cases relied upon by petitioners, wherein offenses which in fact were "diseases" were set aside as "cruel and
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The court also rejected petitioners' contention that imprisonment
of indigents for non-payment of fines violated the equal protection
clause. The court recognized that

". .

. it cannot be doubted that most

persons who have defaulted in the payment of fines have8' 7 done so beHowever,
cause they were unable rather than unwilling to pay."
the court noted, not all discriminatory legislation is invalid. ".
[L]egislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order
to achieve permissible ends" so long as "the distinctions that are drawn
have 'some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is
made.' ",38 The court then found that article thirty-eight possessed such
relevance to its purpose:
The commitment of convicted defendants who default in the
payment of their fines, whether from inability or unwillingness to
pay, imposes a burden on a defined class to achieve a permissible
end in which the State has a vital interest; i.e., that persons who
are found guilty of breaking the laws shall receive some appropriate punishment, to impress on the offender the importance of
observing the law, in the hope of reforming him, and to9 deter the
offender from committing such offenses in the future.
The court's holding in Kelly represents a complete departure from
the firmly established notion that the purpose of these statutes is not
punishment but a means of coercing payment.40 The court's decision
also seems to be directly opposite to the intent of the drafters of the
original Maryland statute upon which article thirty-eight was based.
The title of this act appears to be a clear expression of the legislature's
intent that the statute was designed as a collection device.41
While the court found that confining an indigent for the nonpayment of a fine was not unconstitutional, the court did however
make a distinction between fines and costs. The court first pointed out
that costs were not made a part of the penalty of the statute violated
by petitioners in Kelly. Indeed, costs were seldom made a part of the
penalty in criminal statutes in Maryland. The court then noted the
divergent practices of the trial courts in the treatment of costs. Where
a straight jail sentence was imposed, costs were not included in the
sentence. However, when a fine was imposed, the courts generally
included costs which increased the amount of time to be served in
default of payment. The requirement that time be served for costs
when the sentence was a fine, rather than a straight jail term was,
reasoned the court, a violation of the Supreme Court's mandate in
unusual punishment." See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (conviction for being a drug addict); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966)
(alcoholic convicted of public drunkenness).

37. 285 F. Supp. at 736.

38. Id. at 736-37 (citations omitted).

39. Id. at 737.
40. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
41. The original act was entitled "An ACT to direct in what manner all fines,

forfeitures, and penalties, shall be recovered, and in what manner fines, forfeitures,

amercraments shall be applied." Act of February 8, 1777, ch. VI, [1777]
penalties, and
Maryland Laws.
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Rinaldi v. Yeager.4 2 Thus, the practice was an invidious discrimination which violated the equal protection clause.
Although the court's reasoning concerning the imprisonment for
non-payment of fines is objectionable, its result concerning imprisonment for the non-payment of costs is laudable as a preliminary step
in Maryland toward equal protection in sentencing. The decision was
hopefully to have a significant impact on the average number of persons confined for non-payment and on the length of time that an individual would be incarcerated. Since the period of time that one is
required to serve is computed by lumping fines and costs together, the
imposition of a few dollars costs could significantly increase the sentence of one who defaulted in payment. Because the statute provides
a maximum period of confinement of thirty days for a hundred dollars
of unpaid fines and costs and a maximum of sixty days for fines and
costs between a hundred dollars and $500,"' the addition of four dollars
in costs to a hundred dollar fine would increase the period of confinement from thirty to fifty-two days."
Following the court's decision in Kelly, a second suit was filed
in the district court challenging the constitutionality of sections one
and four of article thirty-eight. In this action, Morris v. Schoonfield,45
petitioners had been convicted of various minor offenses and fines were
imposed as punishment. Petitioners were also ordered to pay costs.
Being indigent and unable to pay, petitioners were incarcerated in the
Baltimore City Jail in accordance with the statutory scheme. Petitioners brought suit alleging that the automatic application of the
sections in question to indigents violated the "excessive fines" and
"cruel and unusual punishment" provisions of the eighth amendment
and the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the fourteenth
amendment as well as the "involuntary servitude" prohibition of the
thirteenth amendment.
The court first turned to the question of costs which had previously been ruled upon in Kelly.48 The court noted that upon the
stipulated facts, notwithstanding its earlier decision in Kelly, widely
divergent practices continued to exist throughout the state concerning
imprisonment for non-payment of costs. 4 7 The court held that, upon

such stipulated facts, the state could not constitutionally include such
costs for purposes of computing time to be served under article thirtyeight, section four. The court did not declare the imprisonment for nonpayment of costs to be unconstitutional per se but merely stated that
the non-uniform application throughout the state prohibited their being
used in computing time to be served. Thus, the court neatly dodged
the issue of whether one could ever be confined for costs where such
42. 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
43. MD. ANN. CODz art. 38, § 4 (1965), quoted in pertinent part supra note 8.
44. Since Kelly was decided when the dollar per day rate was in effect, imposition of four dollar costs to a hundred dollar fine meant that the person was confined
for sixty days instead of thirty days, or exactly doublel
45. 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969).
46. In an earlier case, Dillehay v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1966),
it was held that imprisoning indigents to work out jail fees which accrued during
pre-trial detention was a violation of equal protection.
47. 301 F. Supp. at 161 n.2.
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costs were not a statutory part of the punishment. Recent cases that
have faced this question have concluded that such imprisonment is a
violation of the involuntary servitude provision of the thirteenth amendment since the costs were not a part of the punishment for a crime.4"
The court next addressed itself to the constitutionality of jailing
indigents for the non-payment of fines. It quoted with approval its
earlier language in Kelly in which the court found a relationship between the class defined and the purpose of the statute. Although the
court admitted that the two dollars per day rate was low, and that
a better ratio might be devised, it did not find the statute unconstitutional on its face. In fact, it found that the low dollar-to-jail ratio
suggested a two-fold purpose to the statute: to provide a substitute
punishment for those who cannot pay and to coerce those who could
pay to do so. The court clearly indicated that if the statute's only
purpose were to coerce payment it might run into constitutional
problems when applied to indigents: "The use of compulsion to pay a
fine in the case of a non-indigent is constitutionally permissible, but the
imposition of such compulsion on an indigent defendant might well
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9
Thus, automatic application of sections one and four to an indigent would seem to be unconstitutional, 0 since one of the purposes
would be coercion of indigents. However, the court later opined,
the constitutionality of the statute would be saved if the indigent were
given the opportunity to inform the sentencing judge of his inability
to pay the fine. Such a hearing would enable the judge to take defendant's indigency into account by tailoring the fine to the particular
defendant, permitting installment payments, or reducing the period of
confinement in the event of default. The judge might, if he were so
inclined after such a hearing, permit the original fine to stand: "If
this is done, it will be clear that the commitment reflects only the
substitute punishment for the crime, the imposition of which would not
deprive an indigent defendant of the equal protection of the laws.""
The court's approach to the problem is unique. It appears to be
striking a blow for equal protection by recognizing that the automatic
application of the statutes to indigents might violate the equal protection clause. It then turns around, however, and seizes upon the
substitute punishment theory which it first advanced in Kelly a year
earlier to find a way out of this dilemma. By calling the resulting imprisonment a substitute punishment, all could be solved by providing
the indigent with a hearing in which the coercive force of the statute
is magically transformed into a substitute punishment. The court's
48. Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Wright v.
Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968) discussed in 55 VA. L. RZv. 784 (1969).
49. 301 F. Supp. at 163 (emphasis added).

50. A technical reading of the court's language would be that

assumes
without deciding that such imprisonment would be unconstitutional.theItcourt
is submitted
that the court actually decided that such automatic application of the statutes
in question to indigents was in fact unconstitutional. Any other reading would make
the
court's later discussion of hearings superfluous dictum.
51. 301 F. Supp. at 163.
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attempt at a solution to the problem is as unsatisfactory as it is novel.
Neither the coercion theory nor the substitute punishment theory comports with the equal protection clause as viewed in Griffin.
Statutes providing for the imprisonment of persons who default
in the payment of fines pre-date our Constitution. It has long been
held that the purpose of such statutes is to coerce payment from the
recalcitrant offender. While such statutes have withstood numerous
attacks, many of which were on constitutional grounds, most such
attacks pre-date the more refined view of equal protection found in
Griffin. It is submitted that, in light of the obvious result required
by the broad scope which has been given Griffin, to now ascribe to the
legislature a second purpose in order to save the statute is to engage
in constitutional dishonesty. The original Maryland statute was passed
nearly a hundred years before the equal protection clause became a
part of the Constitution. The statute, in its original form, could not
have been passed with equal protection in mind and it is unlikely that
the legislature also had the noble second purpose that the court ascribes
to it, which happens to coincide with notions of equal protection 190
years later.
The substitute punishment theory requires a re-examination of
Mr. Justice Black's words in Griffin recognizing that "[t]here can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has." 5 2 The spirit of Griffin and its progeny
indicate that the word "trial" should be read broadly to encompass
the entire criminal process. 3 Indeed, the spirit of Griffin may be at
the threshold of securing new rights for indigents in non-criminal
areas. 4 It should not then be too great a perversion of Mr. Justice
Black's words to say "there can be no equal justice where the kind
of punishment a man gets depends upon the money he has." When
two men commit the same offense and one man who can pay a fine
goes free while the other who cannot goes to jail, surely the kind of
punishment has been determined by the amount of money they have.
While, as the court indicated, the judge may change the sentence
after learning of defendant's indigency in a Morris hearing, he is
not required to do so. He may allow the original fine intact, thus
making the determination that the statutory scheme provides an appropriate substitute punishment. Thus, the constitutionality of the statute
in each case is dependent upon proper administration by the trial
judge. Such reliance, however, runs afoul of Supreme Court decisions
which have held that when an unconstitutional statute must rely on
52. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
53. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
54. E.g., Jeffreys v. Jeifreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct., Kings
Co., 1968) (requirement that indigent bear expenses of publication costs in divorce
actions is a violation of equal protection and expense must be paid from public
treasury); Suber v. Suber, No. M-2366-68 (Super. Ct., Union Co., N.J., Aug. 25,
1969) (requirement that publication cost in divorce action be paid by one on welfare
is unconstitutional). Contra Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968).
See Note, Requiring Indigent Seeking Divorce to Pay Cost of Service by Publication
Held Denial of Equal Access to Courts, 29 MD. L. Rev. 406 (1969).
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"benevolent administration" by government bodies to make it constitutional, such reliance is a violation of equal protection. 5
SUBSTITUTE

PUNISHMENT

If the equal protection clause permits different albeit substitute
punishments, based on one's financial status, then the very nature of
the clause should demand that the substitute punishments be equal.
Equal protection simply should not tolerate inequality. In order to evaluate the substitute punishment theory in terms of the equal protection
clause, an examination of the two sentences, jail or fine, is appropriate.
Jail is generally thought of as a harsher penalty than the payment
of a fine.5 6 It is doubtful that many people with the ability to pay a
fine would choose the alternative of jail as the lesser of two evils. In
addition to the obvious loss of liberty, several reasons exist why people
would not make this choice. A jail term, without doubt, carries a
much greater social stigma than does the payment of a fine. It is even
submitted that in the eyes of many laymen, one who is sentenced to
the payment of a fine is not considered a criminal, whereas one who
must "do time" is. Thus, one who in fact has the choice to pay or
not to pay will normally select the former. To choose otherwise would
cause his family unnecessary embarrassment and perhaps jeopardize
the person's present or future standing in the labor force.
One cannot seriously contend that two dollars is the equivalent
of a day in jail. Courts themselves have been critical of the low
rates at which fines are served. The court noted in Morris that ".

.

.a

ratio of one day to each $2.00 of fine seems to set a very low number
of dollars for each day to be served ' 57 and indicated that a different
statute would be preferred. Unfortunately, the court's plea to the
legislature has so far fallen on deaf ears. 8 Even if the legislature
should provide a more realistic conversion factor, the two punishments can in no way be made equal. The intangible factors attached
to the stigma of a jail term cannot be measured with sufficient accuracy
to say that the punishments are equal. It would seem that both economically and socially, jail cannot be considered the equivalent of a fine.
Assuming that the theory of substitute punishment may in some
instances protect the constitutionality of the statute, the statute rears
its ugly head in the most objectionable manner when the statute pro55. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Scales v. United

States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
56. Castle v. United States, 399 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Morris v. Schoonfield,
301 F. Supp. 158, 167 (D. Md. 1969) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Note, Fines and Fining - An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. &v. 1013,
1021 (1953).
57. 301 F. Supp. at 162-63. In discussing the basic unfairness of the low rates,
Chief Judge Desmond put his judicial finger precisely on the point: "To make it
worse, this fine is to be served out at the absurdly low rate of $1 per day in a State
where the Legislature has recently imposed a minimum wage of $1.50 per hour."
People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 218 N.E.2d 686, 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972,
975 (1966).
58. A bill that would have raised the rate to ten dollars per day passed the
Maryland Senate, S.730, but failed to pass in the House of Delegates.
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vides only for a fine as punishment. For certain minor offenses the
legislature has declared that violation of the statute is not such a
serious occurrence to warrant sending the offender to jail. In such
instances, the judge could not send the wealthy offender to jail even
if he wanted to do so for he could satisfy the statute by payment of
the fine. This is the clearest example of an instance where the amount
of money a man has determines the kind of punishment he receives.
Nonetheless, the Morris court considered the problem and concluded
that sections one and four of article thirty-eight are not unconstitutional
in such instances as long as the hearing is provided. 9
A NEED FOR CHANGE - ALTERNATIVES
If it should later be held that statutes such as article thirty-eight
cannot constitutionally be applied to indigents even though they are
given a Morris-type hearing, the legislature will be faced with devising
new ways of punishing those who cannot pay a fine. Even if the statutes are not declared unconstitutional, the legislature may nevertheless
desire to change the present procedure, for as Mr. Justice Goldberg
wrote: "What the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
command, it may still inspire."'
Even if the legislature is not persuaded by the statute's basic unfairness, it may well be motivated by
the statute's economic unfeasibility.
A pertinent inquiry at this point is whether the present system of
fining is adequate to do the job intended. In many instances, fines
are not an effective deterrent to crime today. Two reasons may be
advanced in support of this proposition. In many instances, the fine
prescribed for a certain offense was set by the legislature many years
ago. The natural erosion of the dollar has devalued many fines to the
point of meaninglessness. 61 For example, a ten dollar fine a hundred
years ago may have been the equivalent of several days' or even a
week's work. Today, however, many people can earn that amount in
less than half a day. Thus, inflation has lessened the actual sting
of the fine.
Similarly, economic differences between offenders causes our
present system of fining to have little impact on wealthier offenders.6 2
A $500 fine imposed on one earning $5000 per year is depriving him
of ten per cent of his income. The same $500 fine imposed upon one
earning $10,000 is only five per cent of his income, and only two and
one-half per cent of the income of one earning $20,000. Thus, if the
amount of the fine remains constant, the impact that it has on a particular defendant decreases as his wealth increases. A possible solution to this problem could be to fix the amount of the fine in terms
of a percentage of income. Thus, a ten percent fine would be $500 for
a man earning $5,000 and $1,000 for a man earning $10,000.
59. 301 F. Supp. at 164.
60. Goldberg, Equality and Government Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 205, 218 (1964).
61. See Barrett, The Role of Fines in the Administration of Criminal Justice in
Massachusetts,48 MAss. L.Q. 435, 437-38 (1963).
62. See Note, Fines and Fining - An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. Rev. 1013,
1019 (1953).
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A similar notion has been employed in several countries in the
form of "day fines.""3 These fines, which look to the effect rather
than the amount of the fine, are expressed in terms of units rather
than dollars. The value of each unit is then computed for the particular individual based on such factors as wealth, income, productive
capacity, and number of dependents." In this manner, fines are imposed more equitably and, though disproportionate in amount, they
tend to produce the same effect on all.
In addition to equalizing the effect of a fine between people of
different economic circumstances, day fines have several other advantages. Since such fines are assessed according to a person's theoretical
ability to pay based on various factors, there is more likelihood that
the fine will actually be paid. 5 Not only might this lead to more
revenue to the state but it would also decrease the state's costs of incarcerating those who do not pay.66 Proportioning fines according to
one's ability to pay would also serve as more of a deterrent to the rich
who may under the present system look upon the relatively low fine
as merely the cost of engaging in an illegal enterprise. Theoretically,
punishment should be tailored to have the best effect on the particular
individual. Such day fining statutes would literally force tailoring of
the sentences to individuals.
One of the most sensible alternatives to automatic imprisonment
for non-payment of fines is to permit payment in installments. Many
convicted defendants are unable to pay their fines in a lump sum.
However, if permitted to pay in installments, they may well be able
to eventually pay the entire fine. The use of installment payment of
fines has been widely advocated 6 and is permitted in several states.6 8
Limited authority exists in Maryland for installment payments ;69 how63. "Day fines" are now in use in Cuba, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Note, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days," 57 CALF.
L. Rzv. 778, 813 (1969).

64. In Sweden, a fine may vary from $0.97 to $6984.00. Note, Fines and Fining An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1013, 1025 (1953).
65. The day fine system has been credited with reducing imprisonment in Sweden
for non-payment of fines from 13,358 persons in 1932 to only 286 persons in 1946.
Note, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days," 57 CALIF.
L. Rxv. 778, 814 (1969).
66. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
67. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ; Note,
Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days," 57 CALIF. L.
Rzv. 778, 817-18 (1969); Note, Fines and Fining - An Evaluation, 101 U. PA L.
Rav. 1013, 1022-23 (1953).
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (West Supp. 1966); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4332(c) (Supp. 1966); MASS. GtN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 1A (1959); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.1075 (1954); N.J. Rlv. STAT. § 2A:166-15 (1953); N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 470-d(1) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1967) ; OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 2947.11
(Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953-56 (1964) ; S.C. CoDE ANN. § 55-593(6)
(1962); UTAII CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); WASH. IRV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.070
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 57.04 (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-322 (1959).
69. MD. ANN. CODE art. 52, § 18 (Supp. 1969):
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, in any case where a justice
of the peace in and for Queen Anne's, Prince George's, Carroll, Kent and Charles
Counties has sentenced a person to pay a fine or costs or both fine and costs, said
justice of the peace shall have power, in his discretion, to order that said person
pay said fine and/or costs in installments of such amounts and at such times and
upon such conditions as said justice of the peace may fix.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIX

ever, to be effective the statute70 needs a major revision to extend its
applicability to the entire state.

The advantages of installment payments are manifold. First, and
probably most important, it would avoid the evils of short term imprisonment and permit the offender to remain a productive member
of society. If the offender has no job, he could be given a reasonable
amount of time to find one. The installment system then would not
only keep people with jobs out of jail, but would also provide an incentive for those without jobs to secure one.
Installment payments would also directly benefit the public
treasury. 71 Not only does the cost of imprisonment exceed the two
dollar per day rate at which fines are served, but the state frequently
incurs additional expenses in the form of public assistance to the
prisoner's family. 2 Beyond the immediate financial benefits to the
state are the longer-term social benefits of permitting the man to
retain his job and keep his family together.
The mechanism necessary to collect installment payments could
be located in one of the state agencies, such as the Probation Department. This department would be required to keep the accounting
records and report delinquent payments to the courts. If an offender
failed to make his payments, a hearing would be held so that the
delinquent offender could explain his non-payment. If his non-payment
was caused by his refusal to pay or by his failure to seek employment,
the judge would then have the power to incarcerate him at a rate set
by the legislature. If his non-payment were a result of circumstances
the judge could then alter the time or amount
beyond his control
3
of the payments.1

The traffic offender presents a somewhat easier problem in finding
an alternative to imprisonment for non-payment of fines. If a person
were unable to pay a traffic fine, his name and other pertinent data
could be fed into a computer bank. It would then be a relatively simple
task to match applications for automobile registration and driver license
renewals with this list of names to determine if the applicant has
unpaid fines outstanding. If there is an outstanding fine, his license or
registration would not be renewed until the fine is paid.74
70. Senate Bill S. 730 would have provided: "Installment payments of fine. - The
courts shall have power, in its discretion, in accordance with Article 38, Section 4,
to order that any person sentenced to pay a fine shall pay said fine in installments of
such amounts, at such times, and upon such conditions as the court may fix. Any of
said terms may at any time be revised."
71. The costs to the State of incarceration are not small. The average daily
per capita cost of maintaining a prisoner in the Maryland Penitentiary was $4.83
in 1966. IREORT, FISCAL YEAR 1966, MARYLAND DEPARTMENT Olt CORRECTION 19
(1966). Assuming that this figure, which has surely been increased by inflation, can
be applied to the Baltimore City Jail, the cost of maintaining the 167 prisoners confined for non-payment of fines on May 31, 1969, would exceed $800 per day, or more
than one quarter of a million dollars per year!
72. For example, under Maryland's Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program which provides assistance to families that have been denied parental support,
the average monthly expenditure per family in 1967 was $149.10. Of this amount,
thirty-five percent was supplied by state funds. I PUBLIC WtLFARE IN MARYLAND
15 (1968).
73. See note 70 supra.
74. There is presently authority for a similar procedure in Maryland. MD. ANN.
CoDe art. 66%, § 86C (Supp. 1969), provides that when the appropriate enforcement
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Another alternative available to the legislature seeking to reform
the existing system would be a program whereby those who cannot
pay their fines are put to work for the state. Such persons would be
"employed" by the state at the then existing minimum wage law. The
amount they earn would then be applied as a credit toward their fine.
Such persons could be employed in jobs requiring little skill or experience, such as street cleaning or maintenance, or any area in which the
state might have difficulty in securing an adequate number of men. If
an individual were possessed of a particular skill he could be assigned
to work in such an area where the state had a need for the skill.
While such a state work program would seem to raise again the
equal protection problems present in the existing article thirty-eight, a
careful analysis will reveal that such is not the case. First, such punishment would result in the payment of the fine in services in lieu of
money.7" It would only be the manner of payment instead of the type
of punishment that would be the result of one's not being able to pay
a money fine. Secondly, the rate would reflect a realistic ratio and so
the offender would not have to work longer to pay the fine than would
his "monied" counterpart earning the state's minimum wage. Thus, the
two manners of paying the fine would be more nearly equal. Similarly,
objections based on involuntary servitude would be without merit;
since the work would be assigned as punishment for a crime, the provisions of the thirteenth amendment would not be violated, for that
amendment does not prohibit involuntary servitude as punishment for
a crime of which a person has been convicted.76
CONCLUSION

Throughout the United States, large numbers of people are confined in jails for no reason other than their inability to pay fines.
While on their face statutes providing for such confinement apply
equally to all, it is only indigents who are affected. When the effect
of statutes regulating the criminal process is to cause discrimination
based on the amount of money that one has, such statutes violate the
equal protection clause as viewed by the Supreme Court in Griffin v.
agency is unable to serve a warrant on a traffic offender, the Department of Motor
Vehicles shall attach a notation on his driving record of his failure to appear. Such
person is not then entitled to have his license renewed until he has answered the
warrant and appeared for trial. While the Code excepts parking violations, the
Department of Motor Vehicles takes the position that such procedures may be applied
in cases in which there is an outstanding warrant for a parking violation in Baltimore
City. Letter from Maryland Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to the Maryland Law
Review, Oct. 14, 1969. Since the mechanism is already functioning, it would not seem
particularly difficult to use a similar method of "flagging" for those who do not pay
traffic fines immediately.
75. In People v. Williams, 41 Ill. 2d 511, 244 N.E.2d 197 (1969), the court considered whether imprisonment of indigents for non-payment of fines constituted a
denial of equal protection under Grifin. In holding that it did not, the court wrote:
"The statute was intended to enable the state to collect in labor fines that could
not be collected by execution, and applies as well to a case where a person is able
to pay in labor but not in money as to a case where he is able to pay in money but
unwilling to do so." Id. at 199 (citations omitted).
76. The thirteenth amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
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Illinois. Notwithstanding Griffin, courts have tended to adhere to the
traditional notion that such statutes are simply a means of coercing
payment. So viewed, such statutes do not violate the equal protection
clause so long as the amount of time to be served does not exceed the
maximum authorized term of imprisonment for the particular offense.
In Morris v. Schoonfield, the court finally recognized that
automatic application of such statutes to indigents is a violation of
equal protection. However, the court managed to save the statute by
declaring that the resulting imprisonment was a substitute punishment which was constitutionally permissible if the defendant were
given a hearing at which he could inform the sentencing judge of his
indigency. The court's holding does little to improve the plight of the
indigent and fails to satisfy the requirements of equal protection. The
court's decision seems to ignore both the extreme inequality between
fines and imprisonment and the need for impermissible reliance on
benevolent administration of the statute.
Although the court in Morris finds its procedures to be compatible with the requirements of the equal protection clause, the legislature should be inspired by the clause to change the present system
in the name of fundamental fairness. Constitutional arguments aside,
the practice makes little sense in view of modern penological theories
of individualized punishment when the sentencing judge has already
determined that there is no need to send the offender to jail. There
are more efficient and economical means available to the legislature
which would avoid the evils of short term imprisonment and which
would be an important advance in social engineering. Whether it is
the legislature or the courts that ultimately effect the change, the
present system of confining indigents for non-payment of fines should
be discarded as a relic from another era.

